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DOI: 10.1111/eulj.12235OR I G I N A L MANU S C R I P TMisconceiving ‘seasons’ in global food systems:
The case of the EU Seasonal Workers Directive
Lydia Medland*Abstract
This article discusses the EU Seasonal Workers Directive alongside case study data of seasonal agricultural work
in Spain. The conceptual contribution is to critically consider ‘seasonality’ and the related assumptions around
temporary labour migration for agricultural work. This consideration informs an analysis of the Directive's policy
approach alongside its three global objectives. It is argued that this Directive is likely to fail to meet all three of
these objectives; the assumed timeframe for labour demands does not correspond with unmet seasonal
challenges; the lack of options for undocumented workers already in the EU may compound their marginalisation;
the policy approach of circular migration and limited worker protections does not do enough to prevent new
seasonal workers from falling into situations of vulnerability and undocumented status.
1 | INTRODUCTION
Migration patterns elicited by seasonal demand for agricultural labour have long been a very tangible reality in Europe.
The scale and characteristics of the flows have been very much influenced in recent decades by the development of a
particular economic model of intensive agricultural production and by specific structures of distribution and retail of
agricultural products.1 It is in such a context that we must consider the creation of a specific and distinct legal status of
‘seasonal worker’ in European law by virtue of the 2014 Seasonal Workers Directive (hereafter SWD).2
This article provides an analysis and a critical assessment of this new status by means of confronting European
law with the actual economic and social practices of seasonal work in intensive agriculture, as they emerge from
empirical work undertaken in one of the key ‘enclaves’ of agricultural production in the European Union, namely- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
This is an open access article under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits use, distribution and repro-
duction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
© 2017 The Authors. European Law Journal Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
*School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol, UK. I would like to thank interviewees for their hospitality
and time. I would also like to thank Professor Tonia Novitz for her guidance during the legal research and drafting phases of this paper.
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1See, e.g., J. Gertel and S.R. Sippel (eds.), Seasonal Workers in Mediterranean Agriculture: The Social Costs of Eating Fresh (Earthscan,
2014) and A. Corrado, C. de Castro and D. Perrotta, Migration and Agriculture: Mobility and Change in the Mediterranean Area
(Routledge, 2017).
2Parliament and Council Directive 2014/36/EU on the conditions of entry and stay of third‐country nationals for the purpose of
employment as seasonal workers [2014] OJ 26/02/2014 (SWD). The UK, Ireland and Denmark are not taking part in the adoption
and are not bound by the SWD, paras 54, 55.
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158 MEDLANDEl Ejido (Almería, Spain). From this relatively small (and formerly poor) area comes a large percentage of a number of
agricultural products retailed in all European supermarkets. The economic model of El Ejido is heavily reliant on sea-
sonal workers. Thus, empirical research from this region provides us with key insights allowing us not only to deter-
mine the extent to which the SWD can achieve its proclaimed goals, but also what its likely implications might be.
Data from fieldwork in El Ejido in which I carried out 33 semi‐structured interviews provides an overview of
difficulties faced by workers there. Interviews are supported by observational field notes from my stay in El Ejido.3
Empirical research was carried out between April and May 2012 as part of a project considering working conditions
for migrants in organic and non‐organic agriculture. As such, the comments by interviewees may have reduced
relevance. However, as far as I am aware, many of the challenges in terms of labour relations in the context remain
constant, as for example, both the financial crisis and competition from other producing regions (such as Morocco)
were already underway by 2012.4
The article is structured in three sections. A background is provided on the economic model of intensive agriculture
in Section 2. I outline the key objectives and the crucial content of the Directive in Section 3, and in Section 4 the
empirical data is used to examine underlying assumptions and expose some key implications of the Directive.
The article aims not only to contribute to the growing literature on seasonal workers in European law, but also to
broaden the terms of the discussion of this Directive, moving beyond the legal‐dogmatic analysis of positive law and
towards a contextualised assessment, able to raise crucial relevant and critical questions.52 | INTENSIVE AGRICULTURE, GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEMS, SEASONAL
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS AND MIGRATION
A good deal if notmost of agricultural workmaywell be said to be seasonal by nature. Yet seasonality in agriculture is no
longer inseparably tied to the passing of the seasons of the year. Many ‘seasons’ have been stretched, or re‐orientated
alongside the development of demand‐driven agri‐food systems. This is fundamentally related to the way in which
global food systems have transformed during ongoing processes of industrialisation and urbanisation, and more
recently neoliberal globalisation. Particular food systems for particular food groups, individual food chains, and the
global production networks that they involve thus function together as part of broader ‘regimes’. McMichael has
described these developments in terms of the development of ‘food regimes’ in which transforming structural power
dynamics of international trade, labour and capital are engaged in the production, control, and distribution of food in
particular ways that support broader political and economic structures within an overarching ‘global food system’.6
Although global food systems have altered significantly over the last decades, their development has largely been
pushed forward under a so‐called ‘productivist paradigm’ pursued initially in the 1930s, then during the post‐war era
by state‐led investment, and more recently by private actors.7 This paradigm has facilitated the wide‐ranging3Participants were contacted primarily through the ‘snowball’ technique in which contacts with early participants lead to further
contacts in the field. Some producers were also identified via open access data available via the Andalucian government. See Junta
de Andalucia Sistema de información sobre la producción ecológica en Andalucía (Information system on organic production in
Andalucia), at https://ws142.juntadeandalucia.es/agriculturaypesca/roae/ (accessed 31 August 2017).
4The empirical research was not originally focused on the role of the SWD or circular migration, and therefore in no case do
interviewees refer to the SWD as such. However, the practice of ‘hiring workers in their countries of origin’, was raised on several
occasions, and this refers to a circular migration policy that had already been functioning in Spain since 2004 and that would later
come under the scope of the SWD.
5J. Fudge and H. Herzfeld Olsson, ‘The EU Seasonal Workers Directive: When Immigration Controls Meet Labour Rights’, (2014) 16
European Journal of Migration and Law, 439; C. Rijken, ‘Legal Approaches to Combating the Exploitation of Third‐Country National
Seasonal Workers’, (2015) 31 International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 431; J. Fudge, ‘Migration and
Sustainable Development in the EU: A Case Study of the Seasonal Workers Directive’, (2015) 31 International Journal of Comparative
Labour Law and Industrial Relations, 331
6P. McMichael, ‘A food regime genealogy’, (2009) 36 Journal of Peasant Studies, 139.
7T. Lang and M. Heasman, Food Wars: The Global Battle for Minds, Mouths, and Markets (Earthscan, 2004).
MEDLAND 159intensification and then financialisation of production with public and private actors pursuing the overarching goal ‘to
increase outputs and the efficiencies of labour and capital for increasingly urbanised populations’.8 We can therefore
see that as production is intensified and primarily orientated towards urban consumers, the imperative for cheap food
is prime and wages in agriculture are structurally restrained,9 meaning that many jobs in agriculture have become low
pay jobs. The so‐called ‘supermarket revolution’ of recent decades has permitted demand‐driven food systems to
become the norm.10
The economics of agricultural labour have therefore been transformed in recent decades and migrant workers
have played an important role in this transformation. While profits are typically high for distributors and retailers
(supermarkets), to a considerable extent, this is at the cost of keeping the price of products, and particularly the
necessary labour costs, very cheap.11 Agricultural workers endure arduous working conditions and flexible (and to a
large extent unforeseeable) working times and working hours. In the context of increasing urbanisation and a
progressive exit from farming of younger workers, migrant workers have to a large degree filled the void in those sec-
tors of agriculture in industrialised countries where mechanisation has not taken away a need for manual labour.12 This
is particularly the case in horticulture where tasks such as fruit picking and flower cutting have remained jobs requiring
a significant amount of manual labour.13 The European Commission has indeed stated that EU economies face a ‘struc-
tural need for seasonal workers’,14 most of which would be working in the agricultural sector. The total number of
seasonal workers (mostly in agriculture and horticulture) is estimated to be at the very least 100,000 people a year.153 | SEASONAL WORK IN EUROPEAN LAW: THE CONTEXT
3.1 | The drivers of the European regulation of seasonal work
The European regulation of seasonal work can be said to (i) be part of the general process of Europeanisation of
migration policy; and (ii) have been prompted to tackle the proclivity to hire as seasonal migrant workers in an
irregular administrative situation.3.1.1 | The Europeanisation of migration policy
The regulation of seasonal workers in European law is part of the protracted process of Europeanisation of migration
policy. Once the Single Market was defined as an area without borders, leading in due course to the withdrawal of
internal border controls, the functional autonomy of national migration policies was inherently challenged and the
process of ‘communitarisation’ of migration control was earnestly begun with the Treaty of Amsterdam, later
supported by the Lisbon Treaty, whereby internal opening was accompanied by the external strengthening of8Ibid., at 20.
9A. Corrado, C. de Castro and D. Perrotta, ‘Cheap Food, Cheap Labour, High Profits: Agriculture and Mobility in the Mediterranean’, in
Corrado et al. (eds.), Migration and Agriculture, above, n. 1.
10McMichael, above, n. 6.
11Two commentators have pointed out that, indeed, one of the implicit aims of the SWD was to create the conditions under which the
low wages prevailing in seasonal work will remain so. See Fudge and Olsson, above, n. 5, at 445.
12Corrado et al., above, n. 1, at 10.
13A US government study found, for example, that of all agricultural products, labour represented the highest share of farmers'
expenses in the case of horticultural produce at almost 40% of the cost of production (W. Kandel, ‘Profile of Hired Farmworkers, A
2008 Update’. Economic Research Report No. (ERR‐60). US Department of Agriculture, 2008).
14EU Commission, ‘Commission Staff Working Document: Summary of Impact Assessment accompanying the proposal for a Directive
of the European Parliament and of the Council on the conditions and entry of third‐country nationals for the purpose of seaonal
employment’. COM (2010) 379 final, SEC (2010) 2.
15Ibid., at 3.
160 MEDLANDborders.16 Any third‐country national entering the Union through one Member State could now move within the area
without internal borders. This implied that individual Member States were able to take decisions that could deeply
affect the migration policies of all other Member States.
The common migration policy has been slow in developing and has been marked by tensions regarding its
ultimate objectives. This has in no small measure been influenced by the differing preferences of national
governments related to the various socio‐economic, demographic and economic circumstances prevailing in different
Member States.
While for some time the Commission aimed to define a homogeneous status of third‐country national, for whom
there would eventually be a possibility to gain ‘permanent residence’,17 such an approach has been largely abandoned.
Instead, during the last decade we have seen emerge a complex set of personal statuses of third country nationals,
ranging from ‘blue card’ highly skilled third‐country nationals to seasonal workers. Even a superficial comparison
between the status of workers accepted under the ‘Blue Card’ Directive and the SWD reveals that the latter have
fewer rights and more obligations than the former, particularly when it comes to the right to access and remain in
different EU territories and to socio‐economic rights while legally staying in them.183.1.2 | The focus on migrant workers
Seasonal work emerged as a sector where European regulation was considered by the Commission to be necessary
given the high rate of ‘illegally staying workers or otherwise unregistered workers’ being hired as seasonal workers.19
Some academics suggest that until recently the employment of undocumented migrant workers in sectors such as
agriculture (particularly in Southern Europe) was convenient for governments who could turn a blind eye and avoid
debates on legal migration demands and figures.20 In Spain, the period between the 1980s and the mid‐2000s can
be seen as having significantly altered after regularisation programmes during the 2000s in which many such migrant
workers gained legal authorisation to work.21 In recent years this situation has changed drastically, in part through the
legislative changes through the EU, but also through increasing border control with countries of origin such as
Morocco.
European regulation was thus justified in the name of not only ‘fighting illegal immigration’, but also as an instru-
ment to prevent the exploitation of seasonal workers. The European Union further proclaimed as a complementary
goal creating the conditions for seasonal workers entering the Union legally, and as a result, enjoying fully the set
of rights acknowledged to them.16P. De Bruycker and A. Weyembergh, ‘The External Dimension of the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, in M. Telò
(ed.), The European Union and Global Governance (Routledge, 2009) and Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty establishing the European Community [2007] OJ C 306/01.
17Fudge and Olsson, above, n. 5, at 442. See also P. Olsson, ‘Giving to those who have and taking from those who have not—the
development of an EU policy on workers from third countries’, Formula Working Paper, No. 34, 2012.
18Blue Card workers are offered a set of conditions aimed at being as attractive for highly skilled workers as the American Green Card.
See Council Directive (EC) 2009/50 on the conditions of entry and residence of third‐country nationals for the purposes of highly
qualified employment. OJ L 155/17 (Blue Card Directive). The Blue Card workers, for example, can arrive accompanied by their
families (who also have access to the labour market) and can travel freely to other Member States (see Blue Card Directives para.
14, arts 15, 19). Seasonal workers have neither of these rights (SWD art 22). Differential rights for different categories of workers does
then have the effect of constructing a policy environment of indirect discrimination in which seasonal workers suffer not only from
low pay but also from a second class legal status when it comes to their citizenship and labour rights in comparison to other categories
of temporary workers or EU nationals.
19EU Commission, above, n. 14, at 3.
20C. Gonzalez‐Enriquez, ‘Spain, the Cheap Model. Irregularity and Regularisation as Immigration Management Policies’, (2009) 11
European Journal of Migration and Law, 139; and S. Castles and M.J. Miller, The Age of Migration: International Population Movements
in The Modern World (Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 68.
21Castles and Miller, above, n. 20, at 112.
MEDLAND 1613.1.3 | The regulation of seasonal work for ‘development’
A high proportion of third‐country seasonal workers employed in European agriculture originates from developing
countries. A further aim of the European regulation of seasonal work was to ‘contribute to the development of third
countries’.22 The achievement of this goal is said to be promoted by fostering seasonal migration as a form of recurrent,
or circular migration. Circular migration is considered to be ‘the temporary, recurrent movement of people between
two or more countries mainly for purposes of work or study’.23 This approach is sometimes seen as a ‘win‐win‐win’
for countries of host and origin as well as for migrants themselves because migrants and countries of origin may gain
the benefits of migration (including remittances) while not losing long‐term ties to countries of origin (avoiding brain
drain). Yet many emphasise that this relatively new term (circular migration) refers to the long‐established phenomenon
of ‘temporary migration’ in which migrants are expected to arrive to host countries to work for short periods of time
and then return to their home countries.24 Regulation of seasonal work as ‘circular migration’ is therefore an attractive
option for policy makers but susceptible to many of the same difficulties of older temporary migration programmes.3.2 | Forging the status of seasonal worker in EU law: The seasonal workers directive
The key piece in the European regulation of seasonal work is the 2014 Seasonal Workers Directive. The SWD was






28Ibid.1. To respond to seasonal fluctuations in the economy and offset labour shortages faced in specific
industries/economic sectors and regions;
2. To contribute to preventing exploitation and poor working conditions for third‐country seasonal workers
and illegal immigration;
3. To contribute to the development of third countries.25These objectives can be seen to reflect the policy concerns of the EU, identified in the section above. In the
following sections I will draw on the themes of these objectives and how they actually appear in the case of El Ejido.
The newly coined legal status of seasonal worker is defined by reference to the objective nature of the work (‘seasonal
work’), the subjective identity of the worker (‘the seasonal worker’) and their specific rights and obligations.
3.2.1 | Seasonal work
The SWD defines seasonal work as an ‘activity dependent on the passing of seasons’, or more precisely,an activity that is tied to a certain time of the year by a recurring event or pattern of events linked to
seasonal conditions during which required labour levels are significantly above those necessary for
usually ongoing operations.26It is left to Member States to establish which specific economic activities are to be regarded as fitting into this
definition. Nevertheless, the documents that make up the legislative history of the SWD, and in particular the impact
assessment,27 make it clear that most third‐country nationals who are seasonal workers are employed in the
agricultural sector, with those in tourism representing a smaller fraction of the total.28 Much seasonal work in
intensive agriculture is in fact directed away from natural seasons and is re‐orientated towards the market for themmission, above, n. 14.
Nations Commission for Europe, Defining and Measuring Circular Migration (Conference of European Statisticians, 2016).
s and Miller, above, n. 20.
mmission, above, n. 14.
art. 3(c).
mmission, above, n. 14.
162 MEDLANDproduce on the demand side. The spatial and temporal dynamics of intensive agriculture have therefore deeply
changed, leading to many counter‐seasonal production enclaves.29 In these regions seasonal work therefore
often takes place at precisely the times of year during which production would not traditionally have taken place
(e.g. tomatoes grown in Southern Europe during the winter) and during which production in the importing countries
is very difficult.3.2.2 | Seasonal workers, their rights and obligations
The SWD applies only to third‐country workers normally resident in non‐EU countries; in contrast, the Directive does
not apply to persons usually resident in the EU.30 The SWD, as indicated in its title, sets outs the conditions of both
the admission and stay of non‐EU citizens (third‐country nationals) entering the EU in order to be employed as
seasonal workers.31
In order to be admitted to work in the EU under the SWD, workers must accompany their application with a
binding job offer or a work contract that states details such as the place and type of work, pay and paid leave and
working hours.32 Evidence of adequate accommodation is also required.33
Seasonal workers are guaranteed equal treatment with national workers of the host country,34 extending to terms
of employment including minimum working age, working conditions, pay and dismissal, leave and holidays and health
and safety requirements at work.35 It also includes the right to freedom of association including the right to strike in
accordancewith national law and practice.36 It applies to some areas of social security. Member States must also estab-
lish a complaints mechanism in order for seasonal workers to be able to complain against employers.37 The SWD
requires EU Member States to introduce measures to prevent abuse, and sanctions for any abuses that might occur.38
However, EU Member States may restrict equal treatment in some areas such as for unemployment and family
benefits, education and vocational training.39 In particular, seasonal workers do not have any route towards a
permanent right to stay in the European Union. The SWD establishes that a maximum stay for seasonal work will
be between five and nine months in any 12‐month period, and that this maximum must be determined by each
Member State.40 Seasonal workers are permitted to extend their stay once within this time period to extend their
work contract, or change their employer, if they meet the conditions for entry and if there are no grounds for
refusal.41 If still within the maximum time period permitted to stay, EU Member States may permit workers to prolong
their contract with the same employer and extend their stay more than once.42
In terms of circular migration, the SWD provides for the facilitation of the re‐entry for seasonal workers who
were previously admitted to the same Member State and who respected the relevant conditions during previous
stays.4329Gertel and Sippel, above, n. 1.
30SWD, art 2.1.
31SWD, art. 1.
32SWD, arts 5.1, 6.1.





38SWD, arts 17, 24.
39SWD, arts 5.3, 23.2.
40SWD, art. 14.
41SWD, arts 15.1, 15.3.
42SWD, art. 15.2.
43SWD, art. 16.
MEDLAND 1634 | EL EJIDO AS TEST CASE OF THE EUROPEAN STATUS OF ‘SEASONAL
WORKER ’
El Ejido can be considered a very fitting case through which to consider the way the SWD responds to some of the
current challenges related to seasonal work. This Southern Spanish region is a microcosm through which to study
the potential impact of the SWD, in particular, the extent to which it can be a means of grappling with the different
objectives and interests at stake.4.1 | El Ejido as ‘a global enclave’: Economic model and social realities
When the local social and agricultural organisation and the economic, political and even legal institutions of a place
appear to be functioning together in a way that facilitates the establishment of intense globally orientated production,
specialist scholars use the concept of ‘global enclave’.44 The characterisation of El Ejido as such a ‘global enclave of
production’ is useful to capture the sense in which El Ejido represents an acute but not atypical case of intense
export‐orientated food production in Europe. This is also a case where workers are very vulnerable to both global
and local changes in the political economy, and in related labour arrangements, in part because it is so involved in
the dynamics of globalisation and global trade.
The production model is relatively straightforward. Production is concentrated on a standard group of horticul-
tural crops (tomatoes, peppers, aubergines, courgettes, cucumbers, green beans, melons and watermelons). These
are predominantly cultivated by small farmers, counting on the work of migrant workers. Farmers sell produce either
to ‘cooperatives’ that act as intermediaries and pack‐houses or to auction‐houses where buyers attend in person to
buy loose, unpackaged crops.
Jiménez Díaz estimates that the 30,000 hectares of greenhouses in the El Ejido area are worked by 20,000
small‐scale farmers (owners of the 1 hectare and larger plots) and 40,000 migrant workers.45 This suggests that a
significant number of migrant workers live in El Ejido without residency permits. It is unclear how many undocumented
migrant workers are living and working in El Ejido. While officials assert that irregular workers account for only a ‘small
minority’ (indicating that this number would be many less than those 26,000 with residency permits),46 local union
members estimate that the number could be much larger.47 Only a small number of migrant workers enter the workforce
in El Ejido through the kind of programmes of ‘recruitment in countries of origin’ that the SWD has set out to regulate
and unify across the EU.48 However, one aim of the SWD appears to be to promote the option in regions such as this of
hiring workers who come on fixed‐term visas. Such programmes would therefore fulfil the objective of closing another
door to irregular migrants and facilitating migrant workers to live inside the EUwhen, and only when, they are needed by
employers.
In recent years the case of migrant workers in El Ejido has drawn attention from international organisations,
including the International Labour Organisation (ILO). In several cases the ILO has investigated issues which are
directly relevant to this research. Two direct requests adopted by the International Labour Conference both requested44C. de Castro, E. Gadea and A. Pedreño, ‘Inmigración, crisis del sur de Europa y sostenibilidad social de las estrategias de desarrollo:
El caso de los enclaves productivos de agricultura intensiva’ (Immigration, Crisis in the South of Europe and social sustainability of
development strategies: The case of the enclaves of agricultural production) (2014) 11 Revista Trabajo, 89.
45J.F. Jiménez Díaz, ‘Migraciones en el Sur de España y Desarrollo del Poniente Almeriense (Migrations in the South of Spain and
Development of the Almerian Peninsula)’ (2010) 2 Revista Internacional de Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades, 109.
46El Ejido Municipal Council, Demographic Analysis 2013 Almeria (Municipal Council of El Ejido, 2013).
47F. Lawrence, ‘Spain's Salad Growers Are Modern‐Day Slaves, Say Charities’, The Guardian, 7 February 2011.
48C. González Enríquez and M. Reynés Ramón, Circular Migration between Spain and Morocco: Something More Than Agricultural Work?
(European University Institute, 2011).
164 MEDLANDdetails from the Spanish government on the situation of migrant workers in agriculture,49 a further two observations,50
demonstrated concern about overall labour market conditions in light of the recent labour reform of 2012,51 and in a
committee report of 2014 the ILO also requested to be kept up‐to‐date on legislation limiting collective bargaining.52
Although the foundation for labour rights in Spain is strong (Spain has ratified more ILO conventions than any other
country),53 the particularly vulnerable position of seasonal migrant workers has drawn concern from both local and
international forums. Of particular relevance is that the ILO has expressed concern about ‘the situation of immigrants
in the context of the economic and financial crisis’ and specifically requested information about ‘the situation of
migrant workers in El Ejido’.54 This ILO concern is supported by socio‐economic research in Spain which has shown
that an especially high burden of the social effects of the economic crisis is carried by the foreign resident population
who are particularly likely to have fallen into poverty and unemployment.554.2 | The impact of the seasonal workers directive in El Ejido
The extent to which the status of ‘seasonal worker’ as defined in the Directive can actually contribute to the
achievement of the self‐proclaimed goals of European regulation can be open to serious question on the basis of
the economic and social realities of intensive agriculture in the European Union, as the case study of El Ejido shows.
In particular, the Directive characterises seasonality in ways that do not reflect the actual seasonal challenges faced
by farmers either (i) because labour demand is not seasonal at all (because crops are produced almost throughout
the year), or (ii) because seasonal demand is ultra‐short, a matter of days, not weeks, less so months. Moreover,
circular migration, far from contributing to development, weakens the status of the seasonal worker by neither
providing clear gains to their countries of origin nor offering them any long‐term prospects in their host countries.
Finally, the new status is one extremely difficult to acquire for those seasonal workers who were already working in
Europe, at the very same time that the lack of fit of the Directive with economic reality makes it probable that
farmers will prefer to continue hiring such irregular workers to some extent; the net result is likely not to extend
the legal rights to these seasonal workers, but to condemn them to continued illegality, and further exposure to
exploitation.4.2.1 | Seasonal no more? A season of ten months
If we move from general assumptions to actual practice, the seasonal story is more complex. Industrialised agriculture,
and particularly in cases of ‘global enclaves’ such as El Ejido, has been almost de‐linked from ecological seasons.
Technological innovations in the 1960s and 1970s involved drilling into aquifers for water, the construction of
greenhouses, planting in sand, and agro‐chemical inputs that meant farmers could achieve the necessary climatic
conditions to cultivate crops year‐round in the region. As a result, production seasons in El Ejido now last around49Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR), Direct Request Adopted 2013, Migration
for Employment Convention (Revised) 1949 (No. 97) Spain (International Labour Conference (ILC) 103rd session, 2014); CEACR,
Direct Request, adopted 2013, Labour Inspection (Agriculture) Convention, 1969 (No. 129) Spain (ILC 103rd session, 2014).
50Committee on the Application of Standards ILC, Observation adopted 2013, Employment Policy Convention 1964 – Spain (ILC 102nd
session, 2013); CEACR, Observation adopted 2013, Labour Inspection Convention, 1947 (no. 81) Spain (ILC 103rd session, 2014).
51Spanish Parliament, Law‐Decree no. 3/2012 of urgent measures for the reform of the labour market (Decreto‐Ley núm. 3/2012 de
medidas urgentes para la reforma del mercado laboral). BOE 36, 11/02/2011, 12483–12546, 2012.
52Committee on Freedom of Association, Report in which the committee requests to be kept informed of developments (International
Labour Office, 2014).
53ILO, ‘Ratified Conventions’, at http://www.ilo.org/madrid/espa%C3%B1ay‐los‐convenios/lang‐‐es/index.htm (accessed 9 February
2017).
54Ibid.
55Miguel Laparra et al., ‘Crisis and Social Fracture in Europe’ (2012) 35 Colección Estudios Sociales, 1.
MEDLAND 16510 months56 with the down‐season occurring during the summer, precisely when the traditional ‘season’ for crops
such as tomatoes and peppers would have occurred. In as much as seasonality is still relevant in El Ejido, this refers
to a ‘counter‐season’ occurring when the traditional season would not have been. This counter‐season could be said
to still be tied to a certain time of year but this time of year is as much defined by the market as by ecological seasons.
The season in these terms in El Ejido refers to the time of year when crops such as tomatoes are costly to grow in
Northern Europe and therefore command a high enough price for farmers to produce and sell them in Southern
Europe.
Besides revealing a certain detachment from agricultural economics on the side of the drafters of the Directive,
the ‘contextualised’ definition of (un)seasonal agriculture implies that some of the normative solutions, which may
be regarded as coherent in a context of ‘classical’ seasonality, are set to be highly problematic. A 10‐month season
cannot reasonably be understood to represent a period of time during which ‘labour levels are significantly above
those necessary for usually ongoing operations’. Rather, the labour demand would be more accurately characterised
as ‘ongoing’ or ‘constant’. By the same token, where farmers do have unmet needs for workers with permission to
work and reside inside the EU, it would be just as likely to be for a long‐term and ongoing role, as for the 3–9 month
periods outlined in the SWD. Of course, many farmers may have shorter planting periods or may require workers for
shorter periods of time and I will explore one instance of this. However, it is clear that there is an ongoing demand for
seasonal workers for at least 10 months of the year. Consequently, it seems reasonable to question whether the
labour market for almost year‐round workers is best met by a temporary workforce who are not officially based
in Spain.
Moreover, it is the ‘false’ seasonality of agricultural work that goes a long way towards explaining the reluctance of
farmers to hire workers through circular schemes as that foreseen in the SWD. The new ‘official’ procedure is restric-
tive, and may end up encouraging farmers to work with undocumented workers in open‐ended, longer‐term working
relationships despite the potential penalties that they may face. The small size of many farms in El Ejido leads quite fre-
quently to farmers working alongside one or two workers on a daily basis and developing deep personal relationships
with them (which both parties have a clear interest in developing). We also now have to add a legal framework that is ill
suited to the actual economics of agricultural production (and impinges upon the personal relationship becoming an
enduring one, given the temporal limits on their stay on European soil). Certainly historical practices of what
Gonzalez‐Enriquez referred to as ‘the Cheap Model’ also have their bearing and influence.57 Until quite recently, the
norm for farmers was to hire first and then rely on regularisation programmes to work with migrants to eventually
regularise their status. But the issue is not merely the legacy of a problematic set of practices, but is, as has just been
stated, one closely related to the economic realities and the societal ties of a given mode of production. ‘Irregular’ or
‘informal’ hiring is not an option of choice for most farmers. Still, the fact that some (if not many) farmers are still willing
to hire undocumented migrants for ongoing, rather than just for casual work, demonstrates the long‐term nature of the
working relationships that farmers aim to develop with workers, as well as the investments theymay be willing to make
for workers whom they work well with. In these kinds of working relationships, farmers are looking for reliability and
medium‐ to long‐term availability, something that a 3‐, 6‐ or 9‐month work visa, with no guarantee of year‐on‐year
renewal, may not correspond to. For small farmers, hiring workers in their countries of origin may not therefore meet
this need for workers that can be hired quickly and personally, with long‐term permission to stay and who can be seen
as potentially long‐term employees, available to work for the majority of the year.4.2.2 | The watermelon dilemma: The ultra‐short demand for seasonal work
The section above argues that there is a near year‐round demand for ‘seasonal’workers in El Ejido due to long seasons
which often comprise the majority of the months of the year. There is an ongoing need for workers in planting,56P. Pumares and D. Jolviet, ‘Working Conditions of Moroccans and Romanians in the Greenhouses of Almeria’, in Gertel and Sippel,
above, n. 1.
57Gonzalez‐Enriquez, above, n. 20.
166 MEDLANDpruning, spraying and harvesting labour‐intensive crops such as cherry tomatoes and peppers. However, it is still the
case that the production pattern of other crops results in sudden peaks of labour needs due to certain crop cycles.
This situation is most clearly illustrated by the case of watermelons. Watermelons, unlike cherry tomatoes, or peppers,
require little year round labour, yet, at the moment in which they are ready to be harvested, they require many more
workers than would be needed for their cultivation at other times. In such cases, there is clearly a ‘seasonal need’ for a
larger labour force, but for periods much shorter than those envisaged in European law: a day or two at a time at the
very peak of harvesting or planting.
In my interviews with farmers, four methods of hiring in peak times emerged: relying on (extended) family,
requesting the help of employees of fellow farmers, attempting to hire temporary workers through formal channels,
and hiring workers waiting at roadsides.
Firstly, some farmers emphasised the role of unpaid family labour and the tradition of bringing family members
together at harvest time to help out. Secondly, farmers told me about their personal strategies to balance legality with
peak needs for workers by ‘swapping workers’. In this scenario farmers work with networks of family and friends and
ask their employees to work on a different farm for several days, fellow farmers then respond by asking their own
employees to go and assist on the other farm when the time comes for the harvesting of the corresponding crop.
In this second scenario farmers managed to avoid the strictly illegal practice of employing someone without a contract
and social security with the a‐legal practice of asking their employee to work on another farmer's plot. Thirdly, some
temporary agencies existed, which particularly larger employers used. However, for some smaller farmers the time and
costs involved appeared prohibitive.
Fourthly and finally, it became apparent to me through observational research that some farmers continued to
hire (documented and undocumented) workers informally for short periods without contracts. In this case farmers
would balance the risk of impromptu visits from labour inspectors during this short period of time with the feasibility,
hassle and cost of hiring workers legally with little notice. The data regarding this practice emerged in my inductive
analysis as the narrative of the ‘roundabout’. Residents in El Ejido would often discuss irregular workers at the
roundabout, whether or not the spots in which they waited to be hired were indeed roundabouts or other public
places such as roadsides or village squares. Significantly, one farmer also originally told me that he had no need to hire
extra workers at peak times due to what he asserted as the ‘size of his plot’, which was properly organised so as to be
workable just by himself, his family and the one worker that he had on a fixed contract. However, on following visits,
by chance I met the worker on the fixed contract who was clearly working with another man who was employed
casually without a contract, and both the farmer and the worker then discussed their frustration with the difficulty
of managing labour demands. The contracted worker explained how he would often go and hire someone extra to
help without bothering with a contract unless it would be for several months.
The level of nervousness in the region about undocumented workers and their relation to the agricultural sector
was reflected in the research as a whole and clearly showed up in data analysis. Despite the fact that interview
questions were focused on work in agriculture, the theme around which most quotes were identified was that of
‘personas sin papeles’ or, ‘people without papers’, which is how both farmers and workers most often referred to
undocumented workers.
Despite the attempt by some to portray the very poor living conditions of some migrants as only minor
exceptions to a production model with a well‐regulated labour market, and really very little to do with the agricultural
sector, one example indicated the existence of a persistent structural gap in the labour market. This gap can be seen as
an ongoing demand for workers who could expect to be employed at a moment's notice and paid cash‐in‐hand despite
not having the ‘papers’, for very short‐term work. This, which I describe here as the ‘case of the watermelon’, also
applies to other crops and implies a sudden need for workers who wouldn't be needed during the rest of the season.Once they were going to come [the export cooperative], we were arguing about the watermelons, whether
we should pick them or not and in the end they said to me; “alright, this afternoon we pick them” and I said,






MEDLAND 167don't come”. So I said, “Well, come” and when they come to pick the watermelons, I need a lot of workers,
four people, and so I say, “where am I going to find those people? I can't get…” so I went to the garage in El
Ejido and there were four Africans just there. (Small farmer)In the example above, the farmer resented having to resort to employing workers at a moment's notice from the
informal sector in order to comply with buyer demands. Yet, due to both the nature of the growing cycle and of the
pressure from buyers, the farmer was put in a situation in which the immediate peak need for workers was not met by
the workforce usually working with him. This unresolved question of very short‐term seasonal work has clearly been
recognised by trade unions in the region and others who have tried to develop formal ways in which to deal with it.
However, such initiatives seem to have been only partially successful and other practices for dealing with short peaks
appear to be more common.The workers' organisations here have tried to form a type of bank of workers where, for example, for
watermelons it's only a day but that day I need eight people. Well, so that there's a place that you can
go and get workers that are legal so that that day you don't have problems. Because if not, what? I go
and harvest the watermelon, before what was done, was you told your neighbours, and all the
neighbours came and helped you and when they needed to harvest you went to their plot. They called it
“tornateón”. Tornateón means to say that I go with you today and tomorrow you come with me, that's
how it used to be done. But now things have changed, what's done is, we'll ask for the workers of a
friend or if not, go to the stop and you'll see many immigrants, but those immigrants, well the problem
is that they don't have papers. So there, yes, there is problem with that [seasonal work], a gap.
(Farmer who also worked as a Trade Union representative)4.3 | Circular migration: Does it really work?
The SWD was expressly intended to promote ‘circular migration’. Yet, in this context it is pertinent to ask whether
circular migration as a policy objective can be realised while upholding the rights of seasonal workers.
4.3.1 | Does it make sense to foster circular migration for ‘unskilled work’?
Although the ILO has come out in favour of the circular migration of skilled workers,58 for many reasons, including the
prevention of ‘brain drain’ and the potential of significant remittances, the case for circular migration of unskilled
workers is less clear. Many have suggested that circular migration is just a new way of classifying unskilled workers
as temporary and therefore depriving them of opportunities to gain long‐term residency or citizenship should their
work take on a long‐term character.59 It is yet to be seen whether this attempt to manage ‘legal migration’ and to keep
it temporary and on the borders of Europe will work, as the ILO warns:Policies based on the assumption that migrant workers can be brought in when needed and then sent home
when no longer needed have failed in every region where they have been tried.60Considering that workers might spend up to nine months per year in the host Member State and are encouraged
to return year‐on‐year, the question regarding labour migration posed by Carens is crucially relevant,Is it even acceptable any longer to admit people to democratic states without access to long‐term residence?61ternational Labour Migration: A Rights‐Based Approach (International Labour Office, 2010).
s and Miller, above, n. 20.
ove, n. 58, at 144.
ns, ‘Live‐in Domestics, Seasonal Workers, and Others Hard to Locate on the Map of Democracy’, (2008) 16 Journal of Political
y, 419.
168 MEDLANDSome argue that it is acceptable. Political philosophers Ottonelli and Torresi argue temporary migration defies the
requirements for fixed citizenship rights and that temporary migrants have particular needs in their host countries.62
They therefore advocate the development of a set of particular rights for temporary workers, allowing them to have,
rather than secondary status in host societies, specific rights as tourists or diplomats do.63 This theoretical position is
one that could be seen reflected in the SWD, which attributes the rights to third‐country workers that the European
Union decision‐making bodies have deemed appropriate for their particular situation. Yet, the position appears to rest
on similar assumptions of both the desirability and feasibility of a temporary workforce. As discussed above, the
attitude of exceptionalism to seasonal workers conceiving them as ‘necessary’ but only ‘temporarily’ needed is not
well founded when we consider carefully the ongoing demand for low‐waged labour. Rather than needing a different
set of rights, this appears to be yet another case of an attempt to justify measures which are designed to keep
low‐wage migrant workers as only temporary members of the EU. Such programmes have historically invariably led
to settlement, despite the many efforts to keep temporary migration from developing into permanent settlement.64
There is no reason to expect that the case of seasonal work is any different and leaving workers less protected is
simply likely to make them more vulnerable to exploitation in the process.
The vulnerability of migrant workers does appear to have been taken into account in later stages of the develop-
ment of the SWD. According to the account of its development by Fudge and Olsson, a main achievement within the
SWD appears to have been the securing of the right to equal treatment principle which sets out the principle of equal
treatment between seasonal migrant workers and EU workers.65 This point was also welcomed by NGOs.66
Yet the SWD's labour rights protections are not extensive. Migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to
exploitation when their legal residence status is tied to their employment with one employer.67 This risk is therefore
highly relevant in the case of this Directive, which is ‘demand‐driven’ and where entry permits are dependent on
workers having a contract with a future employer.68 There is a provision in the SWD which aims to weaken this link,
making it possible for workers to apply to extend their stay in order to work for a different employer.69 However, in
not allowing workers to remain in the country when unemployed, it is not clear how a worker facing exploitation
would be able to find another employer. Underlining this danger of exploitation of vulnerable workers is what Rijken
has highlighted as a ‘glaring absence’ of any reference to labour exploitation or trafficking, the knock on effect of this
is that the Directive may fail to ensure protections are available for workers in cases of exploitation.70
Seasonal workers would have only limited employment options as it is a requirement that their passports indicate
that they are clearly within the Member State for the purpose of seasonal work.71 Furthermore, seasonal workers'
access to social assistance programmes could be limited, as they are excluded from unemployment and some
education programmes.72 Overall, this approach is very much one of looking for a special, or reduced set of rights62V. Ottonelli and T. Torresi, ‘Inclusivist Egalitarian Liberalism and Temporary Migration: A Dilemma’, (2012) 20 Journal of Political
Philosophy, 202.
63Ibid.
64Castles and Miller, above, n. 20.
65Fudge and Olsson, above, n. 5, and SWD, art. 23.
66European Network Against Racism (ENAR), European Federation of National Organisations Working with Homeless People, and
Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants ‘Seasonal Workers Directive: Improvements for Treatment of
non‐EU Workers, But Not Enough to Prevent Exploitation’, (2013), at http://picum.org/en/news/picum‐news/42304 (accessed 2
February 2017).
67Olsson, above, n. 17.
68SWD, arts 5, 6.
69SWD, art. 15.
70Rijken, above, n. 5, at 445.
71SWD, art. 12.
72SWD, arts 5(3), 23(2), and ENAR et al., above, n. 66.
MEDLAND 169for temporary migrant workers, and therefore one that, despite equal treatment provisions, does not place them in a
position where they are protected to an equal degree as EU country nationals.4.3.2 | Circular migration of seasonal workers and development
In light of these limits to labour rights we might ask what, if anything, the SWD offers in terms of development?
The SWD fits into the triple‐win rhetoric of the ‘migration for development’ logic that the EU has adopted in
recent years.73 The logic in this regard is that circular migration benefits the country of origin, the country of
destination and the workers themselves. Yet these benefits cannot be understood as equally balanced due to the fact
that it is the EU Member State that establishes the migration dynamic, and being demand‐driven this is established to
respond to the needs of the countries of destination, not primarily to the needs of either countries of origin or the
needs of the seasonal workers themselves.74
The vision of ‘development’ that the SWD aims to offer countries of origin is presumably based on the notion
that seasonal migrants will return remittances and/or savings to their home countries as well as potentially other
skills. However, while the wage differential between Spain and Morocco, for example, is significant, González
Enríquez and Reynés Ramón suggest that the differential is not sufficient to be able to contribute any significant
changes to living standards and nor are the numbers of workers admitted (which is left to the discretion of Member
States) significant enough to have a developmental impact, for example via remittances.75 At least 20 Member
States already had specialised and widely diverging admission schemes for seasonal workers prior to the passing
of the SWD.76
Spain already makes use of programmes such as that foreseen by the SWD to hire seasonal agricultural workers in
their countries of origin as noted above. As charted by the study by González Enríquez and Reynés Ramón, the
programme undertook a rapid turnaround from 2004 to 2005 going from one extreme to the other. In 2004, 60%
of those who entered Spain under the programme overstayed their visas partially due to corruption in the selection
process.77 Following this experience the selection process was revised and those hiring the workers established that
in order to ensure that workers would not overstay their visas they should be mothers of dependent children in their
home state.78 This programme of targeting mothers to work away from their dependent children highlights the extent
to which Member States' individual interpretations of circular migration seasonal work programmes have significant
specific ethical problems of their own, something not foreseen by the SWD.
The ethical questions raised here in the context of examining the SWD itself therefore appear likely to multiply in
relation to the specific ways in which each Member State goes about transposing this Directive into national law. This
is related to the observation of Olsson and Fudge who highlight how many of the clauses in the SWD regarding labour
rights use the term ‘will’ rather than the stronger term ‘shall’, indicating that some of the provisions in the SWDmay be
weakened when it comes to being applied in national law.79 In this context, the ongoing attention to how such
programmes progress and how the SWD is transposed in the coming months and years is vital.4.4 | Workers already (stuck) in Spain
The endeavour to formalise work, particularly through labour inspection, is aimed at preventing a race to the bottom
by striving to ensure that employers provide workers with contracts and that all work is done with social security73De Bruycker and Weyembergh, above, n. 16.
74SWD, para. 3.
75González Enríquez and Reynés Ramón, above, n. 48.
76Fudge and Olsson, above, n. 5.
77González Enríquez and Reynés Ramón, above, n. 48.
78Ibid.
79Fudge and Olsson, above, n. 5.
170 MEDLANDprotections. However, taken together, the measures have also created an increasingly hostile environment for those
migrants who have not managed to gain documentation in order to work legally in the region.
As one unemployed undocumented worker who had been in Spain for 3 years told me, ‘Me, I'm not legal, I'm still
not legal. People who have papers work with their papers.’ He also emphasised that this left him and fellow workers
more vulnerable to poorer working conditions, for example by not being given proper protective equipment when
using chemicals in the greenhouses and feeling less able to complain.
As Olsson charts, the concern for providing an option for migrant workers already in seasonal agricultural work
was raised during the drafting of the SWD.80 Stakeholders put forward proposals to allow for such undocumented
workers residing in the EU to be able to apply for a Seasonal Workers Permit for a transitional period of two years
in order to legalise their status, but this was not accepted. This possibility might have done something to bring the
SWD more into line with the needs outlined by both farmers and workers who are seeking to legalise their own
status or that of their workers. This omission was also criticised by anti‐racism, migrant‐rights and homelessness
NGOs who argue that an option should have been included to allow third‐country nationals already residing in
Member States to apply to work as seasonal workers.81 As Fudge and Olsson discuss, the EU chose in the end to
focus on ‘sticks’ to deter more migrants from arriving in hope of work.82 This decision demonstrates a lack of
sensitivity to the vulnerable and increasingly marginalised situation of undocumented migrants already in places like
El Ejido, who, as discussed above, still fill a gap (as in the ‘watermelon dilemma’) in the labour market which means
that they cannot be detached from the seasonal labour demands of the agricultural sector, and the SWD is unlikely to
remedy this.
From the perspective of a case such as El Ejido, the use of ‘sticks’ can be seen as disproportionate. Following the
economic crisis in Southern Europe, fewer migrants appear to have been arriving in search of work in this region in any
case. This is shown in local government figures where immigration can be seen to be slowing from around 2008.83
Undocumented migrants spoke of the sensation of being trapped, having missed the era of mass regularisations as
well as the periods of economic growth in the region, and the more relaxed attitude to hiring those without
documents in previous decades. This can be related to multiple factors at least including: increased fear amongst
farmers due to labour inspection fines; large numbers of migrant workers now with documentation; the economic
crisis which has led more Spaniards back to agriculture; and finally, increased abilities for farmers to hire overseas,
through policies such as those facilitated by the SWD. The need for more ‘sticks’ in order to discourage further irreg-
ular arrivals is therefore highly questionable. Rather, a route to legality, even if temporary, may have been an option
that some vulnerable workers would have welcomed, alongside their employers.5 | CONCLUSION
In this article I have considered the Seasonal Workers Directive in the light of experiences of seasonal workers and
their employers gathered through empirical research in the global enclave of El Ejido. I have shown that there is a clear
mismatch between the proclaimed objectives of the Directive and how it works on the ground. Firstly, the Directive
defines seasonal work in ways that do not correspond to the economics of food production in the areas where
demand for seasonal work is most intense. Secondly, the proclaimed aim of fostering ‘circular migration’ as a means
of development does not correspond with the low developmental potential of the irregular, insecure and poorly paid
work that is offered to seasonal workers. Thirdly, no specific provisions are included to respond to the situation of
workers who are already involved in irregular employment.80Olsson, above, n. 17.
81ENAR et al., above, n. 66.
82Fudge and Olsson, above, n. 5.
83El Ejido Municipal Council, ‘Evolution of the Population’ (Municipal Council of El Ejido, 2014), at http://www.elejido.es/tuayto/files/
evolucion2.pdf (accessed 2 February 2017).
MEDLAND 171The main assumptions dealt with throughout this article have been around the nature of seasonal work and the
nature of the labour demand that this creates. Through the examination of some of the actual challenging labour
dynamics faced by farmers and workers, I have found that the Directive is ill‐fitted to the economics of agricultural
production and creates a serious risk that the ‘guarantees’ provided to workers may remain dead letter. Meanwhile,
labour needs may continue to be met in informal when not plainly irregular ways, thus fostering rather than an end
to irregular work, a weakening of the position of seasonal workers. The assumed nature of seasonality is met with
a programme of work permits for periods of several months. Yet ‘seasonality’, rather than responding to a particular
time period of unmet labour demands, appears to function more as a legitimising factor for a new system of temporary
labour migration which aims to control unauthorised migration whilst ensuring sectors such as horticulture continue
to attract low‐paid migrant workers.
Furthermore, the Directive, by introducing a unified way through which seasonal workers for this sector can
enter the EU on unequal terms to those entering for other purposes (such as those entering via the Blue Card
Directive) reinforces the structural status of agriculture as a second‐class sector to be manned by second‐class
workers, offered fewer rights and options than those entering the EU to work in other sectors. In this sense, the
chosen case study of El Ejido (situated in Almeria, Southern Spain) is rather typical, if not paradigmatic, of intensive
agricultural export‐orientated production in its dependence on poorly paid migrant workers.
In aiming to construct a Directive which would not challenge the status quo of the sectors involved, nor of the
current model of production and distribution, but rather meet the labour demands of the current system with those
vulnerable due to their temporary status, this Directive appears to do more for employers than for workers. Moreover,
it reinforces the necessary effect that agricultural work will be low‐paid and remain a sector for those workers who are
most vulnerable in society.
Perhaps most seriously, the SWD meets the challenges of undocumented migrants who already carry out
seasonal work in agriculture with no options. This leaves undocumented migrant workers in Europe no further forward
and potentially further marginalised as their employers have more options to contract workers from outside of
Europe. While this approach could be interpreted as firm discouragement for new undocumented workers to arrive
in search of work, it is not clear that it will do any such thing. The scenario that I have discussed as ‘the watermelon
dilemma’ is likely to persist; therefore, the extremely casual and unattractive short‐term work is likely to continue to
be open to undocumented workers.
Finally, the protections available to new workers entering Europe under this Directive are insufficient and leave
them vulnerable to falling into the same pool of undocumented workers resident in the region, looking for evermore
scarce employment. In light of this, and the potential meagre prospects for development via circular migration for
seasonal work, we can see the SWD as failing to live up to its objectives.
At this stage it is uncertain whether the situation as described in this article will change in the coming months and
years due to the impact of the SWD or whether this will simply consolidate current practice and further promote
already existing Spanish circular migration programmes. In either case, the SWD does indicate a policy approach to
seasonal work and circular migration over which Member States (except the UK, Denmark and Ireland) have come
to agreement and could therefore signify the current direction in which EU approaches to seasonal work and similar
low paid work may take in coming years. This policy approach outlines a concerning differential approach to the rights
of temporary workers in relation to EU workers. Social actors should therefore remain as alert as ever to the ongoing
need for further efforts to protect migrant workers, particularly those undocumented workers outside the scope of
this Directive.
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